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The Rise of Speculative Devices: Hooking Up with the Bots of Ashley Madison 
 
Abstract 
I attend to two areas of increasing significance in relation to Web 2.0 since its 
announcement in 2005. The first is a focus on the non-human in digital media 
research, and the second is the normalisation of dating apps in society. Building upon 
ideas from speculative design and speculative method, I introduce the idea of 
speculative devices, those things that are set in place based on a conjecture of an 
outcome. Drawing upon a case study of Ashley Madison, generated using a 
walkthrough method, I demonstrate how the speculative devices of bots and profiles 
can operate, and why. I argue we need to give careful thought to how our research and 
practice is understood, and conducted where speculative devices are concerned. 
 
Introduction 
During July and August of 2015 the media, particularly the online tech press, were 
populated with stories about Ashley Madison. Ashley Madison, provides a dating and 
hook up space for people to engage in discreet encounters, they had been hacked and 
in the region of 37 million account records along with company documentation was 
made public. Much of the attention was given to the lack of morality shown by 
Ashley Madison and its users. Less attention was given to the hackers themselves, 
although an excellent analysis including this group can be found on the Dailynous. 
Journalists scrambled to find lurid stories about anyone, particularly those in the 
public eye.  The site was linked with e-mail accounts of supposed USA Homeland 
Security staff, and other pubic workers, members of several churches and 
conservative religious bloggers. In the wake of the hack, lawsuits have been filed, 
partnerships and marriages have been said to collapse and it has even been suggested 
that it has led to suicides. 
 
Humans were made the centre of this controversy, and the Ashley Madison 
organization was usually positioned as the first digital site where extra partnership 
affairs might be generated. This ignores much of what we know about so called early 
cyber adultery and uses of Tinder, Match.com and OKCupid for clandestine hook-
ups. However, it is not the humans I am interested in here, not directly at least.  The 
hack brought to the fore non-human actors, such as bots (software applications that 
run automated tasks) and hook-up site user profiles.  In Ashley Madison, bots appear 
to be used to chat with human users to keep them engaged, and they use fake profiles, 
created by Ashley Madison employees, as a ‘face’ for the interaction. The same bot 
can inhabit many profiles. These bots and the profiles they inhabit are the focus of 
this paper. 
 
In the next part of the paper I expand on what I mean by speculative devices. For 
now, one can think of speculative devices as those things that are set in place based on 
a conjecture of an outcome – bots and profiles are seemingly active in Ashley 
Madison in the hope they will engage users and generate business for example. I also 
discuss how non-humans have always been implicated in dating and hooking up and 
that although dating apps have risen to prominence since the announcement of Web 
2.0, the role of the Internet in this aspect of life has a much longer history. I then 
explain two ways of thinking that can be combined to help us understand the bots of 
Ashley Madison. These are disclosive ethics and actor-network theory.  Together 
these ways of thinking ask us to consider the links between ethics and digital media, 
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and how we might think of the non-human as having the ability to act with us. I then 
introduce Ashley Madison and describe what the public hack data and other public 
information about the site can tell us about the role of the bots. After this, I discuss the 
bots of Ashley Madison, taking into account my desire to show their agency with us 
and the ethics they are associated with.  I conclude the paper by considering the 
broader implications of this work in terms of learning about, and not causing harm 
with, speculative devices. 
 
Speculating with Non-Humans 
Human agency is a feature of Web 2.0. As Zimmer (2008a) notes in the introduction 
to the preceding issue in this area in 2008, Web 2.0 has been positioned as promising 
creative empowerment, the democratisation of media production, collaboration and a 
more general celebration of the individual. Zimmer goes on to elucidate that questions 
of human agency were, even at that point (and prior to this), much more complicated 
than the evangelists of Web 2.0 would have us believe.  In that special issue, for 
instance, Jarrett questions the forms of agency embedded in participation where 
commercial interests are concerned (Jarrett 2008) and Zimmer (2008b) points to the 
privacy concerns associated with combining Web 2.0 and search engines as they 
attempt to build profiles and predict our intentions. 
 
Since the emergence of Web 2.0, we have witnessed a non-human turn in studies of 
the Internet where the materiality of algorithms, code, interfaces, devices and 
platforms have been seen to come into play. That is not to say before 2005 these were 
not considered, such as in work on menu driven identity (Kolko 2000; Nakamura 
2002) and early work on the technical turn in philosophy (Feenberg 1992; Feenberg 
1995). That said, increasing numbers of scholars have begun to take seriously the 
non-human in their study of the Internet and account for it, for instance, in their 
analyses of algorithmic culture (Cheney-Lippold 2011; Gillespie 2014; Crawford 
2016; Karppi and Crawford 2016), the politics and ethics of platforms (Gillespie 
2003; Gillespie 2010; Light and McGrath 2010) and the role of mediators more 
generally (Brunton and Coleman 2014; Light 2014). It is in the context of the growth 
of attention to the non-human that this work is situated. Through a case study of the 
dating app, Ashley Madison, and a focus upon the positioning and activity of its bots, 
I interrogate the operation of speculative devices as a consideration in a digitally 
networked context.  
 
Speculative Design, Method and Devices 
Speculation has been engaged in several ways in research and practice, particularly in 
a methodological context. Whilst there is much research on the effects of speculation 
in markets of various kinds, I am interested in to how speculation is engaged in terms 
of design and method.  
 
Speculative design is concerned with deploying artefacts, probes and prototypes that 
have oblique and ambiguous functions in order to allow designers and users to open 
up what is at stake in particular events (Auger 2013; Dunne and Raby 2013). This 
approach has been positioned as a way to engage with design to generate alternative 
visions of being, inspire, and encourage people’s imaginations to flow freely (Dunne 
and Raby 2013). It is assumed that humans are free agents and that speculative 
approaches can increase the probability of a more desirable future whilst limiting 
those that are undesirable (Dunne and Raby 2013).  
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Speculative method refers to forms of research approach that have the capacity to act 
themselves as well as be enacted by a researcher. Race for example introduces 
speculative pragmatism, defining it as “concerned not only with what happens, but 
also what might happen, the possible – that is, what might come into being” (Race 
2015b: 500). In another example, the work of Wilkie et al. (2015), discusses bots 
inscribed with particular characters (idiot, parasite and diplomat) and how they are 
deployed with Twitter as a method for generating of discussion with and amongst 
humans about climate change.  
 
Building upon this work, I extend the possibilities for speculative design and method 
through an illumination  of a  particular version of speculative devices. From design I 
borrow the principle of things such as artefacts, probes and prototypes that have 
ambiguous functions as holding the potential to shape and interact with human agency 
to produce sets of associations. However, in contrast to speculative design, I do not 
necessarily associate their deployment with positive or well-meaning outcomes. From 
speculative methods, I take the idea of devices as part of methods resulting in 
unexpected and unknowable outcomes. By device, I mean a thing for affecting a 
purpose, recognizing that objects contribute to the processes of making events that 
constitute society (Michael 2012). To be clear, when I refer to speculative devices I 
see them as holding the potential to be both part of our methodological apparatus and 
an object of our study. In this paper I focus upon a case involving speculative devices 
as an object of study (bots and profiles for example), but in the closing stages of the 
paper, I reflect on this to consider broader implications for speculative devices where 
we might also use them in our methods. 
 
Speculative devices extend beyond the bots identified in the work of (Wilkie et al. 
2015), and technologies of elicitation, such as the discussion group or council meeting 
intended to generate lay views on a public issue (Lezaun and Soneryd 2007). 
Speculative devices are those things that are set in place based on a conjecture of an 
outcome. They possess a degree of ambiguity even though there may be some 
information on hand that has led to the decision to attempt to act in a situation. The 
extent and quality of data and information upon which the conjecture inscribed into 
speculative devices is variable. In the case of digital networks, these may include, but 
are not restricted to, algorithms, bots, interfaces, or global positioning systems for 
example. 
 
Locating the Non-Human in Dating and Hook Up Apps 
The process of dating and hooking up has always involved non-humans. Personal 
advertisements in newspapers and magazines, television, video, the use of filing 
systems by dating agencies, and recreational drugs are but a few examples (Woll 
1986; Phua et al. 2002; Race 2015a; Race 2015b). In terms of the digital, as desktop 
and database applications became more readily accessible during the 1980s, these 
were used by dating agencies as replacements for filing cabinets. In the 1980s and 
1990s, chat rooms and bulletin boards also played a role in dating and hooking up 
(Correll 1995; Shaw 1997; Campbell 2004). Towards the end of the 1990s, sites such 
as Gaydar and Match.com emerged enrolling a networked database logic whereby 
those engaging with such services crafted searchable profiles (Gibbs et al. 2006; Light 
2007). During this time, companies such as eHarmony also used algorithms combined 
with the profiling questionnaires emblematic of traditional dating agencies. Simple 
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geo-locative functions also appeared as mediators during this time. For example, 
Gaydar requested user postcodes/zip codes for their Gaydar Positioning System so 
that users could be presented with profiles nearest to their stated location (Light et al. 
2008). In the mid 2000s websites optimized for mobile devices emerged and services 
such as Gaydar Mobile with its ‘pay as you cruise’ business model appeared as actors 
accompanying users on the move (Light et al. 2008). This occurred alongside the 
vernacular appropriation of technologies for hooking up, such as Bluetooth 
(Mowlabocus 2010). Quite clearly, as with other aspects of the Internet, the 
distinctions often made between so called Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 in respect of user 
participation in content generation and forms of sociality are less than clear cut.  
 
Since the release of the iPhone in 2008, dating and hooking up has become appified 
and the acceptance of using the digital to find a partner or hook up has rapidly 
become normalised in many societies especially as apps engaged with discourses of 
Web 2.0 features and those associated with social media. This process of appification 
has brought with it further non-humans in the form of diverse apps such as Tinder, 
HER, Mixxxer and Hornet targeting a range of dating and hook up markets based on 
segmentations associated with sexual orientations, sexual preferences and 
socioeconomic status for example. Along with these have emerged app stores as 
mediators of practice in terms of operating systems available on particular devices 
and the terms and conditions associated with particular stores as compared to the open 
web (Roth 2015).  
 
In 2015, the Ashley Madison hack raised the profile of a further potential actor in 
dating and hooking up – the bot. In this paper I interrogate the role of speculative 
devices, in the search for, and participation in, discreet encounters where bots are 
present. Before I do this I outline a theoretical and methodological framework for this 
study of speculative devices, one based on combining the work of disclosive ethics 
and actor-network theory. 
 
Disclosive Ethics and Actor-Network Theory 
This work is rooted in the descriptive ethics tradition. Here the aim is to unearth 
narratives regarding morality. This differs from normative approaches which seek to 
determine appropriate practices of conduct (Johnson 2001). More specifically, a 
disclosive ethics approach is drawn upon that allows for the attendance to the norms 
and values embedded in digital media and digital media practices (Brey 2000). 
Disclosive ethics, for example, has previously been deployed in relation to facial 
recognition systems, plagiarism detection systems and Facebook (Introna 2005; 
Introna 2007; Light and McGrath 2010).  
 
It is often argued that things cannot have intentionality and therefore it is not possible 
for them to have morals. Leaving aside animals as non-humans, and focusing on non-
biological non-humans, the point is to see things as coming into being as they interact 
with other things and humans. It is when a set of associations (Latour 2005) amongst 
actors is created that moral conditions can be generated. This has also been referred to 
as heterogeneity – the constitutive mixing of the social and material, the human and 
the non-human, the subject and the object such that each is partly comprised of the 
other (Michael 2012a). For example, a gun being fired by one person upon another 
generates different conditions to those where people fire a gun upon themselves. It is 
at this point that I need to disclose a particular philosophical position in relation to the 
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world that I am taking in this analysis. I am arguing that non-humans matter and they 
do things with us, and I have elaborated on this in much more detail elsewhere (Light 
2014)]. In the words of actor-network theory, the non-human can be mediators that 
transform situations, and ones that we can delegate authority, and morality to (Callon 
1986; Latour 1992; Latour 2005). Combining disclosive ethics and actor-network 
theory has generated the case study of Ashley Madison I present here. The data for 
the case study has been obtained by drawing upon the principles of the walkthrough 
methodi and media reports regarding the hack.  
 
The walkthrough method offers a way to perform a critical reading of apps.  It is an 
empirical method that is informed by science and technology studies and cultural 
studies which, attends to a reading of how a given app presents itself to others and 
how others might engage with it. The method offers a framework which guides the 
researcher in the targeted analysis of an app by examining, for instance, elements of: 
 the environment of expected use – including the developer’s vision, the app’s 
operating model and its governance structures; 
 documenting the app – by exploring registration, everyday use and leaving 
mechanisms through attention to interfaces, functions, content, tone and 
aesthetics; 
 and, unexpected practices associated with the app – such through the analysis 
of associated advice blogs, hacking, resistance, and third party additions or 
manipulations of the app. 
 
The method is used in conjunction with an appropriate set of ideas in the same way 
case study work might be. The method may focus solely on a reading by the 
researcher or may involve interviews with users to gain additional insights into 
individual and group practices.  In essence, the method can be used to construct 
imagined/expected modes of use and those based on user feedback.  In this case I 
used elements of the walkthrough to generate empirical data that discloses the ethics 
of the presence of bots within Ashley Madison by drawing upon disclosive ethics and 
ANT.  
 
To collect data, I examined the site’s public facing pages (including FAQ and terms 
and conditions), recorded the process of creating an account (as a straight single man 
looking for women – based on media reports of the ratio of bots associated with this 
kind of connection making), and explored the site once registered. I concealed my 
profile from public view but populated it with content indicating that I was a gay man, 
using the profile to learn about that site and that I was not interested in any form of 
connection making with men or women. I did this so that I had no interaction with 
humans in the site. Interestingly, this did not stop my profile being bombarded with 
connection requests from female identified bots; the furthest away was in Texas, 
USA.  Since opening my account just over 3 months ago I have received 75 system 
generated messages encouraging me to connect with women’s profiles, 
geographically located in many different countries, and even though my profile has 
been hidden from user view. 
 
I collected data by reviweing media coverage of the hack that occurred in June 2015, 
especially that which referred the data released in the hack. I have not accessed the 
data hack myself because it was obtained illegally, and have therefore relied on 
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various sources, including the walkthrough data I collected, to generate a plausible 
account of how the bots of Ashley Madison operate.  
 
Introducing the Bots of Ashley Madison 
Ashley Madison, owned by Avid Life Media, is self-described as the “leading married 
dating service for discreet encounters” (Figure 1). The service is positioned as a hook 
up app for people in relationships looking for further relationships. These further 
relationships may be formed with the app where the consent and knowledge of all of 
those in a relationship are present or not. As of January 2016, the site’s welcome page 
states that it has over 43.5 million users.  
  
Figure 1. Ashley Madison welcome page (Ashley Madison 2016b). 
 
The site operates like many dating apps – users create a profile, can search for 
connections and communicate with them in a variety of ways. Free user accounts can 
be created, allowing users to receive winks, send and receive photos, add members to 
a favorites list, reply to full members and perform searches. Payment to the site is 
required to send a custom mail-message, initiate a chat session, send a priority 
message and to send virtual gifts. 
 
In mid July 2015, Avid Life Media were warned by the hacker group The Impact 
Team, that unless the site was taken down, a large amount of data about the operation 
of the site and its customers would be released onto the web. This data was said to 
include employee documents and emails, and the real names, credit card information, 
addresses, and the sexual fantasies of users. The rationale for the hack was reportedly 
to stop the exploitation of future users by the site. In the words of the hackers “We did 
it to stop the next 60 million [users being exploited]. Avid Life Media is like a drug 
dealer abusing addicts” (Cox 2015). Avid Life Media did not comply and on the 4 
August 2016 a 9.7-gigabyte data dump was posted to the dark web (Zetter 2015). A 
second dump of partly corrupted data, 20 gigabytes compressed, was released to the 
dark web on the 18 August 2016 (Newitz 2015b), resulting in over a dozen civil law 
suits to be filed in US federal courts against Avid Life Media (Gershman 2015). 
 
Very soon, the data was available across the open web and was the subject of media 
coverage. Annalee Newitz, now tech culture editor of Ars Technica, undertook some 
particularly insightful research (Newitz 2015c; Newitz 2015a; Newitz 2015b; Newitz 
2015d) drawing on the data dumps. In brief, Newitz and her collaborators, reported on 
the presence of fake profiles and the deployment of bots throughout the site. Both the 
fake profiles and bots where almost all identified as women and were configured to 
entice straight male users. These profiles and bots I see as speculative devices. 
 
Newitz’s analyses of the data dump revealed 70,572 bots, 70,529 configured as 
female and 43 configured as male. It was also reported that male users received 
20,269,675 million messages from female bots, and that female users received 1,492 
messages from male bots. Further, female bots engaged in chat with men 11,030,920 
times and, male bots engaged in chat with women 2,409 times. Examining the source 
code of the site, it was possible to see that bot based encounters could be generated 
every few minutes creating an overall sense of women looking for men throughout the 
site (Newitz 2015b). These bots were linked with profiles because they are the mode 
of making connections throughout the site.  
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The presence of fake profiles operating in Ashley Madison had been raised in the 
public domain previously. In 2013, the statement of claim of a former employee is 
said to  — state that she was hired to help launch a Portuguese-language version of 
the site, promised a starting salary of $34,000 plus benefits and was soon asked to 
create 1,000 fake female profiles whose purpose was to entice paying heterosexual 
male members to join and spend money on the website (City News 2013).  
 
The data dump also revealed emails that included details regarding Avid Life Media 
employing people to create fake women’s profiles and to chat with men on the site 
(Newitz 2015b). These emails also revealed that the bots were termed Engagers by 
Ashley Madison staff and these inhabited the fake profiles, known as Angels. Newitz 
reports via her interrogation of the source code’s comments that bots were given 
descriptions of how to act by programmers that has them sporadically focusing on 
engaging straight men: 
host bot mother creates engagers 
birth has been given! let the engager find itself a man! 
randomizing start time so engagers don’t all pop up at the same time 
for every single state that has guest [non paying] males, we want to have a 
chat engager 
(Newitz 2015b) 
 
The vocabulary available to a bot initiating a conversation with a user is also revealed 
by Newitz, as shown in Table 1. Moreover, an analysis of bot activity by software 
engineer Jacob Perkowski has pointed to their geographical pervasiveness as shown in 
Figure 2. Newitz (2015b) has also reportedly identified emails within the data dump 
which catalogue the difficulty the company had in making bots that were able to 
speak 31 different languages in approximately 50 countries. It was also noted that 
developers wrote in exceptions to exclude the bots from being deleted spam sweeps. 
(Newitz 2015b). 
 
Table 1. Bot talk – Adapted from Newitz (2015b) 
 
I’m sexy, discreet, and always up for kinky chat. Would also meet up in person if we 
get to know each other and think there might be a good connection. Does this sound 
intriguing? 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of engager accounts to female accounts by country 
 
A pseudonymous Gizmodo commenter Mr Falcon, was also reported by Newitz to 
have uncovered a special bot service dedicated to those who had paid for the premium 
service Guaranteed Affair (Newitz 2015b). This premium bot would engage male 
users and was configured to encourage them to pay credits, to interact and eventually 
pass them over to an affiliate. It is not clear who or what that affiliate is.  
 
The Guaranteed Affair service promises a user they will find ‘someone special’ 
within three months or they are eligible for a refund (Ashley Madison 2016c). 
However the service comes with particular conditions. An affair guarantee costs $316 
in Australia and affords the member 1000 credits. Credits are used to sustain 
interaction within the site. As at 21 January 2016 it costs 5 credits to send priority and 
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open collect mail messages (the 5 credit charge applies only for the first mail message 
to any given member), an instant Message Session costs 30 credits/30 minutes and 60 
credits for 60 minutes and Ashley Gifts - virtual gifts - are available for 20, 30, and 50 
credits. During the three-month period of the Guaranteed Affair members have to: 
 post a primary photograph in their profile; 
 keep their profile visible at all times; 
 send at least 18 priority mail messages each month, to members they have 
previously had no contact with; 
 send at least 5 Ashley Gifts per month; 
 instant message with members for at least 60 minutes per month through the 
AshleyMadison.com service (Ashley Madison 2016c). 
 
Therefore a member has to use a minimum of 630 of their 1000 credits in meeting 
their obligations for the scheme if they wish to claim a refund if they do not meet 
‘someone special’.  
 
The bots are referred to in the site’s terms and conditions of service in some detail 
(Ashley Madison 2016a). The terms and conditions are approximately 10, 340 words 
in length. I collected these on the 21 January 2016 and I was able to confirm they 
were the same as prior to the hack by obtaining a version published 28 February 2015 
via the Internet Wayback Machineii. From these terms and conditions, I have selected 
the bot and profile related excerpts for analysis in the next section (Table 2). Notably, 
the terms and conditions state ‘These profiles [populated by bots] are NOT 
conspicuously identified as such.’  
 
Table 2. Excerpt from Ashley Madison terms and conditions 21 January 2016 
 
Discussion 
As shown in Figure 3 Ashley Madison users accept the site’s terms and conditions 
during the account creation process. As is often the case in these scenarios, the text 
regarding the link to the terms and conditions is conspicuously small and lightly 
coloured as compared to the ‘I Agree’ button. This is important as it is only the in the 
terms and conditions that the use of bots are mentioned by the company - and they are 
never called bots.  
  
Figure 3. Accepting terms and conditions 
 
Moreover the welcome page, as shown in Figure 1 clearly signifies to a user that they 
can find ‘100% like minded people’ on the site. The site’s strapline ‘life is short, have 
an affair’ reinforces the expectation of meeting humans. The welcome page and terms 
and conditions are contradictory in nature but ultimately a user is led to believe they 
are entering a site full of human encounters.  
 
The hack suggests only 70,572 bots existed in June 2015 in a database then consisting 
of 37 million profiles (Newitz 2015b; Newitz 2015a). It is not possible to determine 
how many of the 37 million profiles were active, or were profiles waiting to be 
inhabited by a bot. Perkowski’s analysis as detailed in Figure 2 suggests a maximum 
ratio of bots to female accounts of 5 per cent around the world. These bots are 
attempting to interact with male users in particular, tens of millions of times, 
according to the data reported on from the hack.  
Light, B. (2016). The rise of speculative devices: Hooking up with the bots of Ashley Madison. First 
Monday, 21(6). http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6426/5525 
 
 
The bots of Ashley Madison are like financial algorithms in that they are, as Karppi 
and Crawford (2016) suggest, built to affect and be affected. The question then 
becomes one of how they are active. Ashley Madison has delegated the speculative 
work of seeking to engage human users to the bots and the profiles they inhabit. Data 
from the hack and the terms and conditions of the site (see Table 2) reveal the 
characteristics and ethics of the encounters involving the bots of Ashley Madison and 
the profiles they work with.  
 
The bots and profiles are positioned as an aid to users in navigating and learning 
about the site and the communications they may encounter. The bots and the profiles 
they work with are characterized as doing good for the community of Ashley 
Madison. This character of being helpful is also carried through to their role in the 
collection of data about users and the monitoring user communications to ensure 
compliance with service terms.  
 
The bots and profiles are also characterized as entertainers. Bot activated profiles may 
send winks, private keys (to additional content about the character associated with the 
profile) or Ashley Gifts. The bots are also inscribed with a language of sexually 
charged playfulness as shown in Table 1. The bots are allowed to have multiple 
partners, just like guest users and members. This character also involves the 
generation of a situation where, obviously, a user will never meet the other party in 
this communication. To reinforce this, the terms and conditions state that “you cannot 
meet any of the images associated with our profiles in person and you acknowledge 
and agree that such communications are solely for your entertainment and to 
encourage your use of our Service”. There are two points to make here. First, it may 
well be the case that a user is fully cognizant of the fact they are engaging with a bot 
and/or they may be very happy to engage in erotic chat and never meet someone. 
Second, through this entertainment process, users are encouraged to use the service, 
generating income for Ashley Madison directly and indirectly.  
 
The direct form of income generation is related to the fact that in order to interact in 
certain ways within the site it is necessary for users to buy credits from Ashley 
Madison. Therefore, the bots and profiles seek to engage users in paying for elements 
of the Ashley Madison service. Indeed, this need for payment can be amplified in 
certain contexts. For example, if a user subscribes to the Guaranteed Affair, they must 
spend a substantial number of credits to meet the scheme’s rules. The hack revealed 
that a special bot service was associated with this scheme contradicting the terms and 
conditions of the service which state that “Our profiles message with Guest users, but 
not with Members. Members interact only with profiles of actual persons.” This use 
of bots expands upon the speculative potential of chat functionality as described by 
Race (2014) who, in discussing hook up apps, states that:  
 
“While the pre-specification of identity and desires may take an element of surprise 
and spontaneity out of the sexual encounter, forestalling the mutual construction of 
pleasures and desires at this scene, chat facilities also constitute a new medium of 
erotic exchange among relative strangers, which has considerable speculative 
potential.” (Race 2015b: 503) 
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In Ashley Madison, bots, as well as relative strangers lubricate this speculative 
potential. This speculative potential can also be read in two ways. It is present in the 
sexually charged maneuverings that chat makes possible where it is removed by the 
pre-structuring of identity in dating and hook up apps as Race suggests. It is also 
present in the generation of revenue, and activities that can lead to revenue for the 
site. 
 
Indirectly, the bots and fake profiles (whether inhabited by bots or not at any given 
time), undertake the work of making Ashley Madison seem populated with (mostly) 
women willing to engage in a discrete encounter. Their speculative work may result 
in income for Ashley Madison as described above, or indirectly as members buy 
credits to spend within the space that seems to offer the potential for a discreet 
encounter. Moreover, there is extra work performed by the member for Ashley 
Madison. The presence of a profile of a member in the space, it being updated and 
present at different times, and in potentially different locations, contributes to the 
liveness of the space for other guest users and members. Further, where the 
Guaranteed Affair is purchased, a primary profile picture is mandatory and this 
animates the site on behalf of Ashley Madison, especially as a requirement is for it to 
be visible at all times. The requirement for significant levels of interaction initiation 
during the Guaranteed Affair period also contributes to this animation work. This 
resonates with earlier work on which points to the roles that users can have in 
producing economic value for platform owners (Arvidsson 2006; Magnet 2007; Light 
et al. 2008; Petersen 2008).  
 
Beyond the obvious ethics of capitalism, there is an underlying disclosure here that is 
unanswerable in this paper. This disclosure rests on the question of the extent to 
which users understand the presence of non-humans in the space and where these are 
known, what their feelings about them are. Reporting on the hack and a comparison 
of this with the terms of service reveals contradictions - where bots approach paying 
members - as I have indicated earlier. Taking this further, it is worth considering how 
bots are inscribed with goodness in the sense that they are, according to the terms and 
conditions, not supposed to bother full paying members. However, the potential 
exists, if the hack data is correct, that the bots target members when they have 
purchased a Guaranteed Affair and that these good bots can become bothersome in 
terms of obfuscating the member attempts at finding a person to hook up with and in 
becoming a drain on their financial resources. Of course this assumes, guest users and 
members do not gain pleasure from the bots.  
 
So far in this paper I have not directly addressed the ethical questions at the heart of 
the raison d'être for the site and how these are, or are not, inscribed within it. Before I 
approach this, there are two points I wish to make. The site is configured in such a 
way that single people can meet for discreet encounters. This means that there is the 
possibility that there are users who are not in a relationship who wish to meet. Indeed, 
one of those filing a law suit against Avid Life Media is a widower who had 
reportedly used the site following the death of his wife of 30 years from breast cancer 
(Pilieci 2015). There is also a particular set of ethics being attached to Ashley 
Madison in relation to the expected standards of normal behavior in a committed 
relationship. Some people do have extra-relationship affairs and hook-ups with 
varying forms of consent from their partner or partners. Moreover, a study of the 
locative data released as part of the hack has shown significant numbers of men 
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seeking men in countries where homosexual acts are punishable by death (Cain 2016). 
Leaving this aside, and focusing upon the popular media coverage of the site, the 
hacking of it, and how the site positions itself, a normative ethic of intimate 
relationship arrangements is present.  
 
Ashley Madison seemingly delegates the morality of engaging in an extra-relationship 
affair to the user, positioning itself as merely an intermediary – the Napster of the 
naughty if you like. This resonates with Jarrett’s (2008) earlier commentary on Web 
2.0 producers where she highlights their strategic denial of authority. Ashley Madison 
further delegates the supposed dirty work of enabling extra-partnership connections 
by introducing bots that encourage users to engage. That said, the delegation only 
goes so far. For example, as discussed earlier, the terms and conditions of the Affair 
Guarantee, and even the name of the service, clearly implicate the site in this ethically 
charged set of associations. A further instance I uncovered was where the 
Travellingman functionality encouraged users to ‘pursue a little something on the 
side’ (Figure 4) this feature also exists for women (Bort 2013). Ashley Madison and 
its bots work together to both provide distance from extra-partnership connections and 
to enable it. 
  
Figure 4. Travellingman functionality 
 
The final point I wish to make is in respect of the mutability of speculative devices. 
Can speculative devices loose their speculative quality? The answer to this question is 
somewhat bound up with the relational ontology I have set up in the definition of 
speculative devices and my subsequent analysis of Ashley Madison using actor-
network theory. Evidence from the hack reveals that when the bots were present in the 
space they generated interactions that generated income. This is clear to see in the 
data I have presented so far. However, further data from the hack, as shown in Figure 
5 reveals that when the bots were turned off income on the site dropped, and when 
they were turned back on, income levels increased. Here, Ashley Madison, engage in 
cycles of anticipation that have been associated with algorithms, where algorithm 
creators attempt (with varying degrees of success) to thoroughly know and predict 
their users (Gillespie 2014). Reinforcing this position, Avid Life Media have stated 
that approximately 70 per cent of the revenue from Ashley Madison is from repeat 
purchases (Avid Life Media 2015). 
  
Figure 5. Turning bots on and off at Ashley Madison (Newitz 2015d)iii 
 
Through this example we can see how the bots may loose an element of their 
speculative character for Ashley Madison because they have an understanding that 
bots will generate income. Yet, the bots simultaneously retain a speculative character 
because there is the chance that they will not continue to provide the outcomes 
expected by Ashley Madison as they come into being with a diverse group of users. In 
other instances, it is possible that the speculative character of a device is lost because 
it leads to guaranteed results. In the case created here, Ashley Madison employees 
could interpret the bots as producing guaranteed results because they appear to 
generate income. What is speculative then, is relational. 
 
Conclusion 
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In this paper I have attended to two areas of increasing significance in relation to Web 
2.0 since its announcement in 2005. The first is the turn to a focus on the non-human, 
and the second is the normalisation of dating apps in society. Through my analysis we 
can see how certain speculative devices operate and why. Moreover, as has been clear 
since 2005, and as richly illustrated in the preceding critical perspectives on Web 2.0 
special issue of First Monday (Zimmer 2008), we can see how commercial interests in 
the internet continue. In particular, this case sheds light on how commercial interests 
in the web are transforming due to the spread of in-app economies. In addition, this 
work challenges the ideology of Web 2.0 in its evangelized version in that it suggests 
that it fails to anticipate and account for the participation of non-humansiv. 
 
Non-humans have always been involved in the process of dating and hooking up - the 
fake profile and the bot are further actors in this context. Moreover, they are actors 
with expected roles. As speculative devices, it is hoped, according to Ashley Madison 
that they will entertain, engage, educate and entice. Profiles and bots go beyond the 
use of the non-human as calculative devices in matchmaking whether this is a 
database or an actual robot such as Dexter, used for entertainment effect, to 
mathematically indicate the compatibility of a match on an eighties Australian dating 
television show (Figure 6). Unlike Dexter, the bots of Ashley Madison get some 
action. 
 
However, the ultimate aim is for the fake profiles and bots to generate revenue for 
Ashley Madison. It is also important to acknowledge the role of the user-generated 
profiles in this context as speculative devices. The profiles users create are also 
intended to variously entertain, engage, educate and entice. The extent to which users 
intend for them to have a commercial aspect, for the purposes of escort services and 
sex work, is less clear. That said, several platforms are known to provide escort 
services, and links with sex work and thus this would be no surprise. Moreover, there 
is an increasing presence of businesses using profiles of contemporary dating apps 
rather than just deploying banner advertisements (e.g. see Young (2016)). For 
example, Grindr, a geo-locative hook-up app for men seeking sex with men has begun 
running pop up Uber ads. Need to get to a hook-up, had an alcoholic drink or don’t 
have a car – we’ve an app for that - is the partnering logic at play. In the future could 
Ashely Madison see profile based advertisers of hotels and lawyers? 
 
Although I have focused here on profiles and bots, speculative devices can take many 
forms and this means that they can be part of a variety of associations and their 
outcomes. For example, an analyst at Target used customer data to predict when 
women were pregnant so they could send discount vouchers to them. This resulted in 
the successful prediction of a high school girl’s pregnancy and the revealing of this to 
her father when he found the coupons (Duhigg 2012). Further, Facebook has 
infamously, engaged the newsfeed in an attempt to manipulate user feelings (Kramer 
et al. 2014). Finally, and an advance on the unexpected nature of speculative devices 
is the case of Microsoft’s Tay (@Tayandyou on Twitter).  Tay was an experimental 
artificial intelligence infused chat bot released onto Twitter by Microsoft in March 
2016. Tay assumed the form of a teenage girl, and was taken offline 16 hours after 
being released because she learnt from offensive tweeting by human users and 
became herself, offensive. 
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It is clear from the case I present here, and these additional examples, that speculative 
devices are implicated in our ethics. This raises the question of where morality is 
delegated to the non-human what do we do when we encounter the unexpected, or 
when we see harms being caused? If we are to continue the project of speculative 
methods, as we should, then we face difficulties in determining the ethics of our work. 
One might say that research is always subject to the unexpected. Beyond the obvious 
legally influenced politics associated with institutional ethics boards, I think we can 
agree that attending to the process of applying for ethical approval of our work is 
helpful in trying to anticipate the questions of morality and harm associated with our 
it.  
 
However, where we deploy speculative method, and devices, we are delegating some 
of that work to non-humans that can act in arrangements in unexpected ways. These 
acts hold the potential to harm before we know what has happened and can intervene. 
If I was going to take an extreme philosophical position on this, I would say it 
becomes impossible to account for such eventualities in our applications for ethical 
approval. More realistically, if we engage speculative devices then we need to be 
clear about what these speculations are and what they could be. This is a similar 
process to that Crawford and Finn (2014) discuss in relation to the repurposing of 
social media data in the future, the potentials of the aggregation effect. We need to 
think through the best and worst of outcomes. However, in addition to just thinking 
about what might happen with our data and research in the future, we need to consider 
how, if and when we adjust where harms are caused. 
 
We can never fully know the outcomes of sociotechnical arrangements. Speculative 
devices have the capacity (which may not be fulfilled) to generate actions, thought 
and feelings about the past, present and future. As a result of these possibilities, we 
need to give careful thought to how our research is conducted and understood where 
speculative devices are concerned in Web 2.0 contexts, and beyond. 
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Notes 
 i A journal paper fully describing the method is in review at the moment and a pre-
publication draft will be made placed here as soon as one is available: 
http://benlight.me/the-walkthrough-method/ 
ii This was the copy available closest to the July 2015 hack. 
 iii Please note the plot area label in the diagram is in the original image, it is not an 
error of cutting and pasting. 
 
iv I am grateful to one of the reviewers of this paper for suggesting this point of 
analysis to me. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. Bot talk – Adapted from Newitz (2015b) 
 
Examples of initial approaches Example of a follow up 
 
hi 
how’s it going 
how r u 
hello 
what’s up 
so what brings you here? 
free to chat? 
 
 
I’m sexy, discreet, and always up for kinky 
chat. Would also meet up in person if we get to 
know each other and think there might be a 
good connection. Does this sound intriguing? 
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Table 2. Excerpt from Ashley Madison terms and conditions 21 January 2016 
 
Reasons given for bot/bot profile existence 
 
In order to allow persons who are Guests on our Site to experience the type of 
communications they can expect as Members, we may create profiles that can 
interact with them.  
 
…we may use these profiles in connection with our market research to enable us to 
analyze user preferences, trends, patterns and information about our customer and 
potential customer base. 
 
We also use such profiles to monitor user communications and use of our Service 
to measure compliance with the Terms. 
 
The purpose of our creating these profiles is to provide our Guest users with 
entertainment, to allow Guest users to explore our Services and to promote greater 
participation in our Services.  
 
and to assist you navigate and learn about our Site. 
 
Interaction possibilities 
 
These profiles allow us to collect messages, instant chat and/or replies from 
individuals or programs…  
 
The messages they send are computer generated. Messages from the profiles we 
create attempt to simulate communications so that should you become Members 
you are encouraged to participate in more conversation and to increase interaction 
among fellow Members.  
 
the profiles may offer, initiate or send winks, private keys, and virtual gifts. Any 
one of these profiles may message with multiple users at the same or substantially 
the same times just like our users. 
 
Our profiles message with Guest users, but not with Members. Members interact 
only with profiles of actual persons. 
 
you cannot meet any of the images associated with our profiles in person and you 
acknowledge and agree that such communications are solely for your 
entertainment and to encourage your use of our Service. 
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Figure 1. Ashley Madison welcome page (Ashley Madison 2016b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of engager accounts to female accounts by country 
Author: Jacob Perkowski see (Newitz 2015b) 
 
 
Light, B. (2016). The rise of speculative devices: Hooking up with the bots of Ashley Madison. First 
Monday, 21(6). http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6426/5525 
 
 
Figure 3. Accepting terms and conditions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Travellingman functionality 
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Figure 5. Turning bots on and off at Ashley Madison (Newitz 2015d) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Dexter from A Perfect Match 
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